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Abstract: 
The story of Pierre Samuel Du Pont de Nemours has often been described as one of success. 
The man was a well-known statesman, economist and entrepreneur in late eighteenth century 
France and his main legacy, the famous and still thriving Du Pont company, suggests a 
brilliant trajectory. The aim of this paper, however, is to analyze Du Pont’s failure in 
performing the political and economic doctrine he was an active promoter of all along his life: 
physiocracy. In all of his very diverse activities, be they scientific, political, or 
entrepreneurial, Du Pont indeed deliberately attempted to enact this original liberal doctrine. 
He tried, along with fellow physiocrats, to introduce freedom of trade and enterprise in Old 
Regime French minds and economic practices. Later, when emigrating to the United States, 
he devised a plan for a physiocratic colony. But none of these ventures was actually a success 
during Du Pont’s lifetime: the performation of some of physiocracy’s main propositions only 
came later, in a diffuse and partial way. We contend that this relative failure of performativity 
can be explained by Du Pont’s specific type of agency: one relying mainly on political 
engineering, based on personal ties and reputations, as well as on a strict distinction between 
ends and means. 
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Analyses of the performativity of economics tend to suggest a “convergence” of economies 
towards a single model, that of the so-called “market economy”, which is said to consist in a 
world of free bilateral exchanges between interested and calculative agencies (Callon, 2007) 
In this idea lies the more or less explicit “critical” dimension of these analyses, which often 
intend to fight, by exhibiting it, the supposedly overwhelming power of “liberal” economic 
theories and theorists. But this argument is weakened by the heterogeneity that one can 
perceive in the field of contemporary economics, with economists often disagreeing over 
what theories should prevail, and various theories emerging, and being performed, that 
contradict the “standard”, “orthodox” model. Because of the proliferation of economic 
literature, the notion of what is “liberal” and what is not has become hard to clarify. In order 
to circumvent this difficulty, our suggestion here is to look back at the modern origins of 
liberal economic thought, when liberalism was first explicitly identified. These origins can be 
found in great part, before Adam Smith, in the physiocratic school of thoughti. The 
physiocrats were indeed, in eighteenth century France, the first systematic advocates of 
“laisser-faire, laisser-passer”, a creed that they derived from what they were also among the 
first to call the “new science” of “political economy” (Steiner, 1998a). 
The critical perspective thus becomes far more specific. Rather than trying to disentangle 
analytically a maze of theorists, practitioners and artefacts that would promote and help enact 
a more or less clearly defined model of the economy, we face a rather small group of people 
who willingly initiated the historical efforts in favour of the liberty of activity and trade. And 
they did so not only as “theorists”, although the word was starting to emerge in the French 
languageii, but also as powerful members of the royal administration, François Quesnay, the 
father of physiocracy, being a close counselor to king Louis XV. Those who where first called 
“the Economists” were thus in charge of actual policies, and performing their theories was 
their intentional goal. Undoubtedly, the most active of them was Pierre Samuel Du Pont de 
Nemours (1739-1817). The man was a restless promoter of physiocracy: he was a 
hardworking editor of physiocratic literature, and this is how he came to be the one who 
coined the word “physiocracy”; but he was also a restless civil servant, who worked for 
successive Contrôleurs généraux des finances (ministries of finance) during his extremely 
long life; and he participated in numerous business ventures, both in France and the United 
States of America, where he first arrived on January 3rd, 1800. This paper proposes to tell the 
story of Du Pont’s life, with a focus on his continuously repeated attempts to make 
physiocracy thrive in practice. 
In doing so, we will try to assess the actual power – and limits – of deliberate political action 
when it comes to performing theories. With Du Pont, we are not only confronted with an 
“economist in the wild” (Callon, 2007), but also with one that explicitly intended to perform 
the political and economic doctrine he supported, and this – as we will see – mainly through 
what may be described retrospectively as “political” means. The performative agency thus 
took a specific shape in the case studied here, where the “sovereign subject” of action was 
over-inflated: the pro-physiocratic agency we observe was dominated by a central character –
 or at least a few ones. What were the consequences of this? Rather paradoxically given how 
liberalism later flourished, Du Pont’s activities seem to have led to repeated “performative 
failures” (Butler, this issue), at least if – at first – we look at them on a limited timescale. In 
their lifetime, most of the efforts of the physiocrats to perform their doctrine actually failed, in 
spite of their tenacity and of the crucial support they sometimes got from a subject as 
“sovereign” as one can get: the king. Liberalism wasn’t born in one day nor through the 
means they expected. The aim of this paper is therefore to account for the rather surprising 
inefficiency of the political engineering used by Du Pont and his fellow physiocrats in their 
performative attempts. 
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PROLOGUE 
Biographical works on Du Pont have been plethoric, but most of them went in either one of 
two different directions that we intend to combine. Biographies of the “honest man”, of the 
“soldier of liberty” have depicted Du Pont’s vivid personality, sometimes brilliantly, as well 
as his family and statesman’s lives, in a way he had inaugurated himself when writing the 
autobiography of his training years (Du Pont de Nemours, 1906). They have also emphasized 
tended to make him the indirect founder (through is second son Irénée) of the gigantic DuPont 
de Nemours & Company chemistry firm, which has been a longstanding symbol of most 
shifts in economic history over the past two centuries, as a managerially and technologically 
innovative firm (Chandler & Salsbury, 1971; Lamoreaux & Sokoloff, 2002; Yates, 1989), but 
also as one relating closely with the Federal state, or developing mass markets 
(Ndiaye, 2007). Thorough studies of Du Pont’s economic writings were also conducted, by 
historians of economic thought, who were sometimes interested in the man’s relationships 
with other economic and political theorists (Weulersse, 1910). But, strangely enough, even 
the “economic biography” of Du Pont’s life as a businessman that is presented in the ultimate 
book on Du Pont’s economic theories hardly connects these two aspects of the character’s 
trajectory (McLain, 1977). Writings and actions are seldom mixed, and this may explain some 
interpretation problems, with Du Pont’s various biographies contradicting one another on 
certain points. 
But Du Pont, although he had multiple lives, remained all along a particularly coherent 
character. As an intellectual, he was so coherent that he was even criticized as a man of 
“system”. He also made his acts as adequate as he could to his thoughts, be it as a civil 
servant or as an entrepreneur. “In short, as Gustave Schelle puts it in the hagiographic tone 
shared by most biographers of the ‘great man’, all the acts and all the writings of this thinker 
were inspired by a constant sentiment, which is nowhere expressed more sincerely: the love 
of humanity and justice” (Schelle, 1888:3). If one must depart from the hagiography, it is 
nevertheless difficult not to agree with such an insistence on Du Pont’s integrity. The reading 
of his rich epistolary production reveals how much he made efforts to make his actions fit 
with his thoughts, and conversely, not only by following whatever vague “constant 
sentiment”, but also by using in practice the intellectual tools he had conceived as a published 
writer, or by transforming present events into opportunities for renewed reflection on his 
theories. Letters, as a communication genre, do favour this kind of fit between thought and 
action, but it needs to be stressed that Du Pont’s published writings themselves also interacted 
closely with his personal experiences. It was the case, obviously, of his Philosophie de 
l’univers, which was written as a reaction to the Terror and which prescribed rules for 
individual behaviour that Du Pont then tried to obey (Du Pont de Nemours, 1795). It was also 
the case of his economic writings, that were always in direct touch with what he did and 
observed as a man of action. 
The types of rationality that structure what may be considered as Du Pont’s “theoretic” 
writings have been analyzed elsewhere, Philippe Steiner having shown with much clarity how 
Du Pont contributed to the emergence of “formally rational” economic knowledge without 
renouncing a certain “material rationality”, that of theories designed for action, especially in 
the political sphere (Steiner, 1998b). But Du Pont’s “action writings” – the legal texts he 
produced, as well as his letters, prospectuses, and working documents, especially those in 
which he formulated his business projects – have not been given much attention. These 
documents take us one step closer to action, as close as one can be to the relation between 
acting and writingiii. We will analyze these texts in their chronological sequence, in order to 
account for the successive performative efforts made by Pierre Samuel Du Pont de Nemours 
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all along his life. From the reign of Louis XV to the Restauration, Du Pont indeed changed 
priorities, starting as a member of the royal administration in the 1760’s, but then sailing 
away from the Directoire to the United States, out of discouragement, in the last months of 
1799, with the project to realise physiocracy through business, rather then policy. Failing to 
do so, he came back to France and civil service as early as 1802, and then only went back to 
the US for his very last years, in 1815. 
DU PONT’S SCIENTIFIC PEDAGOGY 
In the early 1760’s, Du Pont was looking for a position, after having renounced being a 
watchmaker – as his father was and wanted him to be – or a doctor – a profession he had 
trained for but never actually practiced. He had read Vauban and just written a treatise on 
taxes, thanks to which he managed to get introduced to Quesnay, the father of physiocracy, 
and became his protégé, before being that of Turgot. This was the beginning, for young 
Du Pont, of a long carrier at the service of the royal administration, mainly in the Bureau of 
commerce as General inspector of commerce and manufactures. But it was especially the time 
of his entry into Quesnay’s “writing workshop,” (Théré & Charles, 2008) which made him 
part of a group that its opponents called the “Sect of Economists” because of its intellectual 
coherence, of its obedience to its master, and of how keen its members were to see their 
doctrine enacted. 
Physiocracy indeed proposed an original conception of the social function of science. It 
presented human societies as being naturally ordered, ruled by essential laws that would 
guarantee the happiness of each and everyone. This was made especially clear in Du Pont’s 
synthetic presentation of the physiocratic doctrine, On the origins and progress of a new 
science: “There is a natural Society, that is anterior to any convention between men, based on 
their constitution, on their physical needs, on their evidently common interest” (Du Pont 
de Nemours, 1768). According to these anti-hobbesian principles, the absence of happiness in 
society was exclusively due to the adoption of bad conventions by men. The complete 
satisfaction of needs and interests was indeed possible only if these conventions met certain 
conditions. The “state of nature” that was described by Du Pont and his fellow physiocrats 
indeed differed from the one conceived by Rousseau, whose “noble savage” was promptly 
satisfied. Man does aspire to “enjoyment”, i.e. both that of the goods that are necessary to his 
survival, and that of his fellowmen’s company, which includes sexual enjoyment, with its 
consequences in terms of population growthiv. But “the spontaneous productions of the earth 
and waters are not sufficient to make a numerous population subsist, nor to provide men with 
the goods they deserve” (Ibid.). Hence the necessity for men to be able to “multiply 
productions, culture, in order to improve their condition” (Ibid.). This is where what we 
would today call the “economic” part of Du Pont’s discourse started. He demonstrated that 
the necessary growth of the “net product” of agriculture was made possible by nature, but 
required that men obey nature’s “essential Laws”, which consisted in the defence of property 
and liberty, thanks to which men were encouraged to undertake any productive activity and 
were stimulated in doing so by open competition. As we can see, the science of natural order 
did not prescribe another world – be it a primitive world, or an under-world – that men had to 
create entirely from scratch, in opposition to the current world. Physiocracy was only meant 
to make visible a back-world that was already here. This was one of the meanings of the 
“évidence” that knowledge was meant to have according to Quesnay, followed in this by his 
disciples, Du Pont being the most fervent of them. 
This conception had strong consequences on the relations between science and action. 
Scientific writing itself became political action. It had to shed light on the practices that had to 
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be supported for the natural order of production and commerce to actually come into being. 
And it had to do so in a specific way, so that it could be understood by the right audience. 
Du Pont was aware of this very early in his author’s life, as it appears in the foreword of his 
first published memoir, On the exportation and importation of grain (1764): “Since truth 
exists by itself, and since it is in nature, to demonstrate doesn’t mean anything else than to 
show; and the art of judging is nothing else than the talent to open one’s eyes”. Du Pont 
reached this goal in two ways. First, he developed a concise argumentation, made of a 
succession of explicitly differentiated and articulated paragraphs that each provided a new 
argument. Second, he supplied figures to support his ideas. This was an essential element of 
the intellectual style of physiocratic thought, and one of its main innovations, as it has often 
been emphasized about Quesnay’s Tableau économique, first published in 1758 
(Quesnay, 1760). Du Pont took over the same method, and designed his own “Tableau” to 
account for “the effect of the liberty of international commerce of grains, relative to the 
growth of Agriculture and Revenue” over ten years (Cf. Figure 1). Without scrutinizing the 
details of the cash flows depicted in this table, one may notice at first glance that Du Pont 
made a considerable effort to make these cash flows more easily readable than they were in 
Quesnay’s “zigzag”. The cash transfers from one year to the other only appeared in a single 
and carefully designed column, that of the “net product caused by the increase in productive 
advances, depending on the proportion of agriculture in the given year”. Annual lines were 
therefore easily distinguished, and the distribution of the net product in between the different 
classes of economic actors was made clear by the separate columns. The demonstrative power 
of such a presentation was meant to convince its readers, by making their future readable. But 
who were these readers? 
 
 
Image 1 : « Tableau » in Pierre-Samuel Du Pont, De l’exportation et de l’importation des 
grains, 1764, p. 46. 
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The “Tableau” provides first elements of answer to this question. The data it exposed, like 
those of Quensay’s “zigzag”, were not macro-economic data, but those of an exemplary farm. 
The physiocrats addressed first and foremost farmers and landowners, the main 
recommendation being that the latter should reduce their conspicuous consumption and invest 
the spared cash in their farms, in order to increase the productivity of these, for their own 
benefit and that of society as a whole. In order to make this point convincingly, the data were 
also empirically founded. On the one hand, Du Pont and his fellow physiocrats made good 
use of the figures provided by journals that prescribed methods of “wise ménagement”, like 
the Journal œconomique, which was born in 1751. On the other hand, the physiocrats all 
participated in gathering data from actual farms, thanks to a systematic collection of 
accounting information in the French countryside, with the notable help of the “Agricultural 
Societies” that flourished all over the national territory during the period. It was particularly 
the case in Soissons, where the Society “gather(ed) agricultural memoirs dealing with the 
county, debating of big culture, and publishing by the end of the Old Regime its own 
questionnaire (for farmers)” (Perrot, 1978:563). It happened to be precisely in Soissons that 
Du Pont made his débuts at the service of the royal administration, as an assistant to the local 
Intendant from 1763 to 1765, a period when he came to meet with Turgot – himself the 
Intendant of Limoges – and got more familiar than his urban education had enabled him to be 
with the operations of French farms. This action of physiocrats towards farms was twofold. 
Of course, it aimed at improving the empirical adequacy of their theory. But it also 
participated in the circulation of accounting models in the French countryside. Combined with 
Du Pont’s intense editorial activity in journals such as the Journal de l’Agriculture (from 
1765 to 1766) and the Éphémérides du citoyen (from 1768 to 1772), this peaceful commerce 
of information was meant to contribute to the hold of physiocratic thought over the “social 
base” it intended to build upon. 
Thanks to their texts and tables, the physiocrats did succeed in disseminating their ideas in 
certain categories of society and in becoming thus more than a centralised agency. But the 
actual influence of their well-known doctrine seems to have been quite limited at first. 
Farmers and other entrepreneurs may have been convinced by the doctrine and the accounting 
instruments that went with it. But the most powerful category, that of landowners, proved to 
be difficult to convince through scientific pedagogy and administrative activism. The subtlety 
of Du Pont’s arithmetic argumentation, although it was partly compensated by the greater 
“simplicity” of some of his fellow physiocrats, made it difficult for his ideas to reach the 
nobility, that did not manage its estates itself. On top of that, noblemen were not at all 
supportive of the growing legitimacy given in the nascent bourgeois society to agricultural 
entrepreneurs, whose contribution to big culture versus small culture was widely acclaimed 
by the physiocrats (Franklin, 1978). The hope of Quesnay and his followers to see landowners 
act spontaneously according to their “well understood interests” therefore got dimmer and 
dimmer during the reign of Louis XV, who died in 1774. The deliberate performation of the 
physiocratic doctrine through scientific pedagogy was a failure in the short run. 
DU PONT’S ECONOMIC POLICIES 
Luckily enough, or so it seemed, the physiocrats had devised another and possibly more 
effective mode of action, that Quesnay called “economic governement”, to perform their 
theories: the idea was to pass “positive Laws” by the mere “declaration” of the “essential 
Laws of social order” (Du Pont de Nemours, 1768:§8) described in the physiocratic doctrine. 
If landowners couldn’t be convinced to become reasonable, then it was possible and necessary 
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to impose some constraints on them so that they be compelled to act more wisely, in their own 
interest and in that of the kingdom. The dispersed agency of scientific pedagogy could be 
replaced by a pure exercise of power from the central political authority. The problem, 
however, was to enforce these laws and not just declare them: the illocutionary force of the 
sovereign’s speech acts and legal texts was far from being unlimited. 
While Quesnay was alive, in 1763 and 1764, the promulgation of the Edict of July 19th, 1764 
officially “made” grain and flour trade entirely free in all the kingdom except for Paris and its 
surroundings. “The preambule of the Edict, partly written by Du Pont, who was then working 
with Turgot, was a real physiocratic profession of faith” (Charbit, 2002:870), the Edict being 
designed so as “to animate and extend the culture of land, whose product is the surest source 
of wealth for a State, to maintain abundance thanks to stores and the arrival of foreign grain, 
to stop grain from having a price that would discourage the cultivator, to avoid monopoly 
through the final exclusion of all particular permissions, and through the free and complete 
competition in commerce; finally maintain in between nations this communication of 
exchanges between unnecessary items and necessities, which complies so well with the order 
established by divine providence, and with the views of humanity that must guide sovereigns” 
(Cornette, 1993:131-132). But the hopes of performation of their theory by Du Pont and his 
fellow physiocrats through such means also proved to be deceived. The following year, bad 
harvests and fears related to a possible increase in the price of bread – which was previously 
submitted to a strict regulation –, made the enforcement of the Edict difficult. Local 
parliaments slowed the process down, and the “judges and police officers (…) issued 
ordinances that opposed the laws they were meant to enforce” (Du Pont de Nemours, 1770, 
cited in Charbit, 2002:871). Declarative law wasn’t sufficient for the performation of 
physiocracy without a disciplined administration that would help make it real throughout the 
country through constraint. 
Similar difficulties occurred from 1774 to 1776, after Louis XVI called Turgot back to office 
and issued the Edict of September 13th, 1774, which declared once again the entire liberty of 
commerce. The decision indeed caused flour shortages: it “created an atmosphere of intense 
speculation, opened new markets for commerce, disorganized production, and raised fear and 
uncertainty”, leading to what has been called the “flour war” (Kaplan, 1976:488). The 
situation got even more complicated at this point, because of Turgot’s simultaneous attacks 
against the privileges of the nobility, attacks which he considered were made necessary by the 
terrible situation public finances were in. Finally, the Anglo-French commercial treaty of 
1786, for which Du Pont acted both as an “economic counsellor” and a public advocate, under 
the supervision of Contrôleur général Vergennes, met with an unfavourable economic 
conjuncture as well as with the opposition of a nascent group of promoters of industrial 
production, led by the Chamber of commerce of Normandy, which was worried that English 
competition would compromise the industrial development of France (Murphy, 1966; 
Démier, 1995). 
The performation of the physiocratic doctrine as a general system of free trade meant to foster 
production and satisfaction in the French population therefore appears to have been a difficult 
task, especially when attempted through such authoritative political means. Du Pont, who was 
a restless worker, managed to remain a member of the administration until the last years of 
the Old Regime, working notably with Calonne and Necker during the 1780’s. In the 1790’s, 
however, he progressively lost hope in the possible advent of the natural order he had been 
calling for over the years. His last attempt at performing physiocracy through policy consisted 
in being a candidate for the Constituent Assembly, where he expected to be able to promote 
his ideas better. Speaking directly to the representatives of the different classes of population, 
he would have a chance to make them side with him for some important votes: power derived 
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from widespread influence, which had to be gained by speaking in the convincing way to the 
right people. He was indeed elected as a deputy for the bailliage of Nemours in March 1789 
and became the President of the Assembly in 1790. The following year, he created a printing 
shop, both to make a living and to be able to print the texts he wanted to disseminate, 
including first of all physiocratic pamphlets by himself and other authors – notably Quesnay 
and Turgot, who had respectively died in 1774 and 1781. He even created a journal a few 
years later (in 1794), called L’Historien, where he could freely express his positions. 
However, the Terror, to which he survived only out of luckv, seems to have definitely turned 
him away from what we would call today his “economic” preoccupations and the especially 
the defence of freedom of trade and the promotion of investment in agriculture. According to 
James McLain, “from this period to the last decade of his life, political thought replaced 
economic thought as his primary intellectual interest” (McLain, 1977:46). The unstable 
situation of the French regime would indeed have made the increase of farm production a 
secondary goal for Du Pont, who mostly focused, from then on, on the promotion of what his 
master Quesnay had called “legal despotism”, which was the necessary institutional 
precondition to the passing of physiocratic laws in favour of trade and agriculture in France. 
But even that proved difficult in the troubled times the young French Republic was going 
through. As a member of the Council of ancients from 1795, Du Pont opposed the Directoire, 
which led to his being arrested and imprisoned in 1797 during the Fructidor 18th coup. The 
printing shop he had created and which was his main source of revenue was ransacked during 
the events. The situation was so bad that his freedom, wealth and life were threatened. 
Under these circumstances, Du Pont’s biographic trajectory shifted drastically in 1797: he 
decided to leave France for the United States of America, with all his family. But the problem 
in France, as a matter of fact, was less for him the menace against his life and properties, than 
the contradiction between his political ideals and the way things were evolving on the French 
scene. Political action as he conceived of it was no more possible for him, and he therefore 
had no reason to stay (Thompson, 1969), as he explained it to one of his American 
correspondents in a letter from January 20th, 1800: “When I took the painful resolution of 
moving away from my homeland, it was because its Constitution was destroyed, because force 
reigned instead of Laws, because the Republic wasn’t anymore anything more then a word, 
and because only arbitrary power was actually left instead of government. The choice that 
was left was only between civil war, which is the most horrid of evils, and the cold winter of 
retreat”. Du Pont therefore resolved to being named by the Institut National a “travelling 
scholar for a stay in the United States of America”, where he was expected to undertake 
botanic and agronomic studies… but also planned – once again – to make physiocracy 
flourish, although through other means than those he had unsuccessfully used until then. 
DU PONT’S ENTREPRENEURIAL VENTURE 
“Since, for this mission, the Republic only (gave him) diploma, and no money, (he set up) the 
means of paying for his trip”, by planning to create an agricultural and commercial company 
in the United Statesvi. Du Pont’s entrepreneurial project was thus at first a project by default, 
dictated by financial necessity. But he rapidly added positive motivations to the negative 
ones. 
The perspective of moving to the United States was indeed a source of renewed enthusiasm 
for him. This appears clearly in the dozens of letters he sent from December 1797 to May 
1798 to his eldest son, Victor, who was then in Charleston as a member of the consular corps. 
Du Pont enthusiasm also in the growing width of his project: the necessary amount of capital 
for his expected settlement in the US was first evaluated at one hundred thousand francs 
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before rising, only a few months later, to four million. Apprehended through the scope of the 
descriptions and narrations that had been made by travellers he had met or read, the seemingly 
virgin American land was deeply attractive to him, allowing him to hope for better days. 
Finally, Du Pont’s admiration for the founding fathers of the United States, as well as for the 
constitution they had written and about which he had tried to give them his advice 
(Franklin, 1866; Jefferson, Du Pont de Nemours & Chinard, 1931), contributed to his 
enthusiasm. He had been impressed by the ideas and personalities of men such as Franklin 
and Jefferson, whom he had both met during visits they had made to Paris in the previous 
decades, and he was willing to see them again, as well as the Republic their minds had built. 
The call of America thus participated in stimulating new hope, for Du Pont as for many others 
before and after him. The opportunity to reform his homeland was thus widely compensated 
in his mind by this idea that there was a place on earth where he could undertake radically 
creative actions, free of constraints. 
The man, from then on, was bound to design the future through new means. But he didn’t 
renounce his political and economic ideals. This appears clearly in the project he devised in 
the last months of 1797, while he was still in France. “We will do the trade of France, Spain, 
the West Indies, Mauritius, etc. In the interior, (we will do the trade of) buying and reselling 
land, education, buying and reselling cattle, salted meats, cheese, butter, etc. The best hopes 
of the company will be put in this interior commerce of food, because it does not have to fear 
corsairs and brings back actual money. (…) It seems that we will locate our trading house in 
Alexandria, our rural house in the counties of Hampshire or (Lardies) in Upper Virginia on 
the South Branch of the Potowmack”vii. As one can see, Du Pont’s physiocratic doctrine 
guided his business action in its overall structure: wealth was meant to come exclusively from 
the agricultural production of a “rural house”, but it could not be valued without an intense 
commercial activity, just as Quesnay had stated it when he counted traders in the “fertile 
class” of population (Steiner, 2000:620). Although he had to act in a new way, Du Pont 
therefore kept his physiocratic ideals. And he even kept wanting, not only to respect 
physiocratic principles, but to perform a whole physiocratic economy. Indeed, combining 
both the businesses he was planning to undertake, Du Pont, who enjoyed turning his name 
into an adjective, intended to found a real “Pontian colony”. 
From his correspondence, it is possible to date the Extract of a plan for a rural and 
commercial operation to be realised in the United States of America – from which the 
following excerpts are taken – to as early as November 1797: “On the outskirts of our lands, 
we will buy a farm and some cleared up land. This will be the main rural establishment and 
the head of family operations. We will call land-clearers, and we will make them settle by 
promising land and cattle. (…) We will immediately raise a lot of cattle, because their 
education requires few hands (…). We will spread amongst neighbours various rural 
industries, so that they love us, and to multiply butter, cheese, the preparation of salted and 
smoked meats, that we will sell either for cash or for other goods. We will establish a store in 
the valley, with all the objects that will be necessary to the everyday life of the land. (…) The 
3rd or 4th year we will place a tavern in its most busy part (…). In five or six years, we will 
establish a school where Virginians will be much more willing to send their children than in 
Europe (…). On the 7th or 8th year, we will build a perfectly non-flammable house, made of 
stone, bricks and iron, for the conservation of acts of interest to families, and the various title 
deeds. This depot will bring to the city founded by the company the constituted authorities. 
Thus, the main establishment of the company will become the capital city of the county, and 
maybe one day of the state, the situation of the land, its size, its possible population, and the 
laws of the country authorizing us to hope so. Then would the prosperity rise to an 
incalculable level”viii. As one can see, the spatial and temporal scope of the enterprise was 
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that of a utopia which, over the XVIIIth century, had become a common place literary genre, 
closely related to the practice of colony planning that was also thriving at the time (Pacquot, 
2007)ix. Du Pont established on paper a whole, small-scale society, listed its components, 
articulated them with one another, and thus conceived a complete and efficient social system, 
that deserved a prosperous future. Such a representation of the future was a real attractor for 
him: it was because he succeeded in figuring out his America that the potentialities he saw in 
her became meaningful to his eyes, and could drive his actionsx. 
How efficient was this document? Its preparation did contribute to making Du Pont 
enthusiastic and active, for sure, but it was also destined to other actors, and especially 
financiers and merchants who could provide capital for the project. Presented in a neater and 
more definite way in an Overview of a commercial establishment to be formed in America by 
the Dupont de Nemours Fathers and Sons & Company, the plan indeed circulated in 1798 and 
1799 among potential shareholders. This version, slightly different from the previous one, 
notably specified with much more clarity the financial structure of the establishment: “The 
society will last for 12 years. It will not be allowed to put together more than 400 shares of 10 
thousand pounds each, to form the capital of 4 Millions. Each year, until the liquidation of the 
society, their will be stock dividend, for the interest of capitals, that will add to the generous 
benefits of the enterprise. This dividend will amount to 4 per Cent for the 4 first years, 6 per 
Cent for the 4 following years, and 8 per Cent for the four last. A (unreadable word) of 200 
acres will be reserved for every shareholder, per share, at the price of primitive acquisition, 
and that every shareholder will use how he pleases”xi. Du Pont thus conceived the financial 
aspects of his plan in a purely calculative way, starting from a minimum dividend that 
equalled the maximum level long imposed to interest rates in Old Regime France (4 %) 
(Perrot, 1978). Such a document as this Overview seems at first to be a device proposing 
nothing more than seductive but unfounded promises to those it was destined to, i. e. 
financiers and merchants that could have been interested in becoming shareholders of the 
company. 
Du Pont did however try to remain relatively prudent, or so it seemed. In his letters to his son 
Victor, he showed a certain anxiety: he was impatient for his answers and advice, that only 
reached him in the spring of 1798. In the meantime, Du Pont told his son that: “(he would) not 
fix (his) ideas on any of the said points, nor decide on (his) plans before having talked with 
(him)”, because he felt he was not able to evaluate precisely from France the opportunities 
offered by the American landxii. As for Jefferson, whose protégé he claimed to be, he didn’t 
even dare write to him about his project at firstxiii. To fight his doubts, and with the help of his 
second and youngest son Irénée, Du Pont gathered empirical information about American 
markets, in booksxiv, but also thanks to various stories he had heard through the American he 
could meet in Paris. These descriptive and quantitative data were for instance the basis of his 
decision on where to locate his settlement: “this valley can nourish seven hundred thousand 
inhabitants and it doesn’t count twenty thousand. (…) The still uncultivated earth of this 
valley is of admirable quality, can cost to the company from only one piaster and a half to 
three piasters, and be sold for up to eight to ten guineas. (…) The house of commerce destined 
to vivify the rural establishments will be located in Alexandria. There, it will be less costly 
than in Philadelphia, closer to the rural establishments, and also adequate for commercial 
operations. It will be possible when the time comes, to move it to Washington City where we 
already envisage a few happy speculations on the location of houses, like those that made 
Franklin wealthy in Philadelphia”. The mix of maps, data and stories that appears in this 
short extract reveals how much Du Pont tried to present himself as sufficiently knowledgeable 
about America. 
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In spite of these efforts, the main guarantees the physiocrat offered for his promises were 
purely a matter of personal ties and reputations. First of all, trusting the project was trusting 
Du Pont himself, and this was meant to be encouraged by the fact that he and his family 
“(were) known for being protected by Jefferson, vice-president of Congress, and Washington 
their common friend”. Trust in the project was also meant to be encouraged by trust in its 
other contributors, whose names were listed as supplementary securities: “MM. Dupont 
Father and Sons, his son-in-law Bureau de Pusy, La Fayette, Biderman, Beaumarchais, 
Johannot, La Tour Maubourg, Adrian Duquesnoy, Rousseau, Bisson Leloup, and Bellefond 
Bourcard and Fourtaler & Company”. Although some important members of this list finally 
backed out (e.g. La Fayette and Rousseau), or died before they actually subscribed (e.g. 
Beaumarchais, however quick an investor he was), the document did enable Du Pont and his 
son Victor (who had just come back from the US) to raise some capital before leaving France: 
they gathered a total of about one million francs, out of the four they had planned to getxv. It 
must be underlined, though, that the economy that was thus performed by Du Pont remained 
not so much one based exclusively on reciprocal economic interests than a truly political 
economy, based on a hierarchical system of relations and reputations that he thought 
quintessential to the establishment of trust. 
The outcome of Du Pont’s venture suggests this mode of action didn’t allow for success in 
business. Having landed with his family on the American soil on January 3rd, 1800, Du Pont 
rapidly discovered, partly thanks to Jefferson – whom he had finally written to –, that the 
“virgin” lands of Virginia were in fact already subject to an intense speculation, and therefore 
far too expensive for him to be able to buy any. Furthermore, the law forbade their being 
bought by a foreign citizen. And, finally, Du Pont admitted that the lands he had dreamed of 
buying and settling on with fellow Frenchmen weren’t really suited for such people: “The 
French don’t like to travel, except in places where they can find good cooks, gay customs and 
loose talk” (cited in Aimé-Azam, 1934:342). The physiocratic utopia could not be. Du Pont 
therefore chose to limit his activities to their commercial part, and started writing various 
memoirs, notably On the commerce of France with the United States and On the 
establishment of ocean liners for the governmentxvi. His new project indeed consisted, partly, 
in organising secure maritime liaisons between France and the United States, especially for 
the benefit of the French government, which for instance included providing supplies for the 
French Navy in Saint Domingue (Haiti). Du Pont thus went back to his previous speciality, 
working for governmental actors, and trying to seduce them thanks to a political discourse on 
the national interest of his project. But the French authorities were not interested the 
proposals, and Du Pont himself started to complain, from the first months of 1801, about how 
uninteresting business matters were to him now that his perspectives were deprived of the 
possibility to create a physiocratic colony. Renouncing progressively his entrepreneurial 
ambitions, he went back to France in the spring of 1802. His efforts at performing 
physiocracy from scratch through business enterprise in the US had also failed. 
EPILOGUE 
As we have shown, what seems to be a real lack of success in the performation of physiocracy 
may be widely explained by Du Pont’s specific performative agency. His actions rarely 
enabled him to rally the people and things whose participation in his projects seemed 
necessary: the landowners were reluctant to distribute revenues as he and his fellow 
physiocrats prescribed; the Directoire was more in favour of industry than agriculture, which 
impeded its receptivity to Du Pont’s stance on liberty of activity and trade; financiers were 
reluctant to only trust his name and not know more about the foundations of his American 
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project; the American land was hardly adequate to his dreams; etc. In all cases, it seems that 
Du Pont, along sometimes with his fellow physiocrats, failed to appeal to these people’s 
interests. He always acted, rather, by trying to impose onto others a future he had devised. 
Forgetting partly about actual conditions and about the dispositions of the people he 
addressed, he focused instead steadily on his world-to-be. As long as actions were well 
thought of, i. e. defined deliberately in accordance with the so-called “natural laws”, they 
were bound, in his eyes, to succeed: one just needed to describe them to gain other people’s 
interests and the sovereign subject, guided by physiocracy, could therefore not fail. In 
Du Pont’s eyes, as he confidently told his main shareholder in a letter from the United States 
where he presented his new projects of maritime commerce, “mens agitat molem”: mind 
moves the massxvii. Quoting Virgile’s Æneidxviii, he thus admitted his belief in the capacity of 
ideas, coming from a unique and divine source, to impose themselves bluntly and simply onto 
the world. For him, agency was thus, in a way, pre-dispersed into the world: embedded in 
contexts that only had to be stimulated by a knowledgeable actor to shift the way he wanted. 
The only problem was that the principles of the “natural” political economy Quesnay had first 
described proved to be less “natural” to other people, and even made little sense to many of 
them. Nature had forgotten to expect Du Pont’s actions, and physiocracy therefore couldn’t 
emerge through mere political engineering. 
The paradox of Pierre Samuel Du Pont de Nemours’ story is therefore that it has not been 
remembered as one of failure. This is due mainly to his son Irénée who, having left France for 
the United States with his father, devised his own business plan as soon as the fall of 1801: he 
was willing to establish a “manufacture of sporting and war gunpowder”, following what he 
had learned while he was the young protégé of famous chemist Antoine Laurent 
de Lavoisier’s at the state-owned company of powders, the “Régie des Poudres d’Essonnes”, 
ten years earlier, from 1787 to 1790 (Bret, 1994; Dujarric de la Rivière, 1954; Tronc, 1994). 
Pierre-Samuel did support his son’s project financially but, at the outset, more because of the 
failure of his own project than out of real enthusiasm. The father was obviously more 
affectionate with his eldest son Victor (whom he considered a “child of love”) than with 
Irénée (the “child of reason”), who was not very much into cultivating high-rank connections 
like his father and sibling were. On top of that, the idea of his son creating a gunpowder 
manufactory was not a source of great pleasure for a man who had always been a fervent 
pacifist. Hence, when writing to Jefferson on behalf of his son to recommend his gunpowder 
for the army, Du Pont only dared speak explicitly of “sporting gundpowder” and insisted on 
the fact that Irénée had been named by his godfather – Turgot – after the greek word for 
Peace. Finally, the manufacture was nor an agricultural nor a commercial venture, and thus 
didn’t fit very well in the old physiocrat’s principles. Even after his first American project had 
proved unsuccessful, he wrote to friends in France describing Irénée’s project as being only 
the family’s eighth in terms of importance. It’s performative prospects were too meagre. 
Yet, apart from a later period in 1810 when Du Pont momentarily turned against his son with 
his other shareholders because he believed Irénée should have paid them dividends, Du Pont 
took on the gunpowder manufactory, which succeeded in surviving and paid most of the bills 
of the family – although with difficulty – from its launch to Pierre-Samuel’s death in 1817. 
Du Pont endorsed and supported the project out of personal interest, but also, paradoxically, 
because it may have been the most physiocratic of all the business projects he had ever been 
involved in. The project was indeed adequate to much of Quesnay’s doctrine, although it 
wasn’t so because of Du Pont’s influence but much more because of Lavoisier’s. The famous 
chemist, Irénée’s teacher, was a proclaimed physiocrat, for whom gunpowder manufacture 
could foster agricultural production – that of saltpetre, or nitre, the main raw material needed 
for such a production – just as the trading of grain did (Bensaude-Vincent, 1993; Dujarric 
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de la Rivière, 1949; Poirier, 1996). Moreover, Lavoisier was like Quesnay a keen follower of 
Condillac’s sensualism, which prescribed a detailed attention to reality, and its accurate 
measurement whenever possible (Dagognet, 1973). When planning the establishment of his 
manufacture, Irénée made efforts to anticipate thanks to accounting simulations not only the 
amount of capital he needed – like his father had done for his own project – but also of the 
revenues the manufacture could actually yield in the following years. He notably visited other 
American manufactures in order to do so. Irénée thus performed physiocracy, while 
conceiving the manufacture, as an entrepreneur intent on measuring reality before making 
prospective calculationsxix. 
The comparison between the two men is quite telling. Contrary to his father, Irénée seldom 
referred to the doctrine of the “sect”. A young, post-Revolutionary man, he also had less 
connections and no reputation. He therefore had to act in a way different to his father’s. 
Aspiring only to domestic happiness, rather than envisioning the whole political economy, he 
was compelled to act economically and planned his manufacture step by step, through the 
close qualitative and quantitative observation of the contexts he wanted to settle in. He 
engaged into a thorough “enquiry”, in the course of which he progressively constructed his 
action and revised his plans (Dewey, 1938). And he found the tools – for instance synthetic 
profit and loss statements – that enabled him to do so in his teacher Lavoisier’s physiocracy, 
rather than in his father’s. Less of a sovereign subject than Pierre Samuel, Irénée tried to read 
the potential agency of things and people, comparing for instance closely the powder 
manufacturing technologies he observed in America with those he had been taught about in 
France, in order to see on which one he had better to rely. Irénée thus performed physiocracy, 
but he did so in a very local, as well as extremely partial way: if he effectively enacted, in his 
conduct and manufacture, some founding physiocratic principles, he for instance had no effect 
whatsoever on liberty of trade. 
Yet, quite unexpectedly, this liberty of trade did become a reality in France a few years later. 
The Restoration of monarchy that occurred in 1815 was indeed a blessing for the Physiocratic 
theory and Du Pont, who had mostly turned towards the natural sciences after 1803, as well as 
worked at the Paris Chamber of commerce for a while. The fall of Napoleon was also that of 
the “neo-mercantilist industrialism” he had promoted, and of the industrialists that supported 
such a doctrine. At the same time, one discovered that some of the ideas that the physiocrats 
had restlessly defended for years had progressively been accepted as possible alternatives to 
Napoleonic policies. Embedded into formulas like “laisser-faire, laisser-passer” that could 
easily circulate and be memorised, they had gained ground in some parts of society. Some of 
the “natural laws”, separately from one another, finally sounded somewhat “natural” to more 
people. Having long opposed the emperor and his approach to the economy, as well as served 
kings Louis XV and Louis XVI, Du Pont was considered a wise old man and was thus named 
in 1814 the Secrétaire général du gouvernement provisoire, in charge of the transition 
between the two regimes for a couple of weeks. There, without the noble landowners who had 
been been partly disempowered by the Revolution, he was able to contribute a little to the 
“revaluation of the land property of notables”, a fringe of population that would soon become 
the basis of the new monarchy… and that had been defended from the start by the 
physiocrats. Laws liberalising business and trade were also issued in the first months after the 
Restoration and, in spite of the strong rise in prices and the riots that came up consequently, 
making the setting up of taxes for foreign grain a political necessity, the liberty of commerce 
inside France became a long-lasting fact. “This political line is typical of the ‘adaptations’ 
that the heritage of physiocracy underwent; it had been inherited as a doctrine and seen as a 
dogma of the ‘sect’, but was accepted pragmatically” (Démier, 1995:237). 
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The performation of physiocracy by political engineering had failed but, with the Restoration 
and the advent of a “dispersed subject” favourable to segments of the “sect’s” doctrine, 
Du Pont participated before his death in the collective, “repeated and errant process” (Butler, 
this issue) through which elements of the physiocratic doctrine were finally enacted. 
REFERENCES 
AIMÉ-AZAM D. (1934), Du Pont de Nemours, honnête homme, Paris, P. Ortiz 
BENSAUDE-VINCENT B. (1993), Lavoisier. Mémoires d'une révolution, Paris, Flammarion 
BERNARDIN DE SAINT-PIERRE J.-H. (1773), Voyage à l'isle de France, à l'isle Bourbon, au cap 
de Bonne-Espérance, Amsterdam & Paris, Merlin 
BRET P. (1994), « Lavoisier à la Régie des poudres : Le savant, le financier, l'administrateur et 
le pédagogue », La Vie des Sciences, Comptes rendus de L’Académie des sciences, vol. 11, 
n°4, 297-317 
CALLON M. (2007), « What Does it Mean to Say That Economics is Performative? », pp. 311-
357, in MACKENZIE D., MUNIESA F. & SIU L., Do Economists Make Markets? On the 
Performativity of Economics, Princeton, Princeton University Press 
CHANDLER A. D. & SALSBURY S. (1971), Pierre S. Du Pont and the Making of the Modern 
Corporation, New York, Harper & Row 
CHARBIT Y. (2002), « L'échec politique d'une théorie économique : la physiocratie », 
Population (French Edition), vol. 57, n°6, 849-878 
CORNETTE J. L. (1993), Histoire de la France 1652-1783. Absolutisme et Lumières, Paris, 
Hachette 
DAGOGNET F. (1973), Tableaux et langages de la chimie, Paris, Le Seuil 
DÉMIER F. (1995), « ‘Néo-physiocratie’ et première industrialisation française », pp. 231-248, 
in DELMAS B., DEMALS T. & STEINER P., La diffusion internationale de la physiocratie 
(XVIIIe-XIXe), Grenoble, Presses Universitaires de Grenoble 
DEWEY J. (1938), Logic: the theory of inquiry, London 
DORIAN M. (1961), Du Pont de Nemours. De la poudre au nylon, Paris, Plon 
DU PONT B. G. (1925), Life of Éleuthère Irénée du Pont from Contemporary Correspondance 
- Volume 5 (1799-1802), Newark (Del.), University of Delaware Press 
DU PONT B. G. (1933), Du Pont de Nemours (1739-1817), Wilmington, Pierre S. Dupont 
DU PONT DE NEMOURS P. S. (1764), De l'exportation et de l'inportation des grains. Mémoire 
lu à la Société royale d'agriculture de Soissons, Paris, P.G. Simon 
DU PONT DE NEMOURS P. S. (1768), De l'origine et des progrès d'une science nouvelle, Paris, 
Desaint 
DU PONT DE NEMOURS P. S. (1906), L'enfance et la jeunesse de Du Pont de Nemours 
racontées par lui même, Paris, Plon Nourrit et Cie 
DUJARRIC DE LA RIVIÈRE R. (1949), Lavoisier économiste, Paris, Masson 
DUJARRIC DE LA RIVIÈRE R. (1954), E.-I. du Pont de Nemours, élève de Lavoisier, Paris, 
Librairie des Champs-Élysées 
 15 
DUPONT DE NEMOURS P.-S. (1770), Observations sur les effets de la liberté du commerce des 
grains, et sur ceux des prohibitions. Par Du Pont, Basle 
DUPONT DE NEMOURS P.-S. (1795), Philosophie de l'univers, Paris, Du Pont 
ETNER F. (1987), Histoire du calcul économique en France, Paris, Economica 
FRANKLIN B. (1866), Correspondance de Benjamin Franklin, Paris, Hachette 
FRANKLIN R. S. (1962), « The French Socio-Economic Environment in the Eighteenth 
Century and Its Relation to the Physiocrats », American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 
vol. 21, n°3, 299-307 
JEFFERSON T., DUPONT DE NEMOURS P. S. & CHINARD G. (1931), The Correspondence of 
Jefferson and Du Pont de Nemours, Baltimore (Md.), The Johns Hopkins press 
JOLLY P. (1956), Du Pont de Nemours, soldat de la liberté, Paris, Presses universitaires de 
France 
KAPLAN S. L. (1976), Bread, politics and political economy in the reign of Louis XV (vol. II), 
The Hague, Nijhoff 
LAMOREAUX N. R. & SOKOLOFF K. L. (2002), Intermediaries in the U.S. Market for 
Technology, 1870-1920, Cambridge, MA., National Bureau of Economic Research 
MCLAIN J. J. (1977), The Economic Writings of Du Pont de Nemours, Newark, University of 
Delaware Press 
MURPHY O. T. (1966), « Du Pont de Nemours and the Anglo-French Commercial Treaty of 
1786 », The Economic History Review, vol. 19, n°3, 569-580 
NDIAYE P. (2007), Nylon and Bombs: DuPont and the March of Modern America, Baltimore, 
Johns Hopkins University Press 
PAQUOT T. (2007), Utopies et utopistes, Paris, La Découverte 
PERROT J.-C. (1978), « La comptabilité des entreprises agricoles dans l'économie 
physiocratique », Annales, vol. 33, n°3, 559-579 
POIRIER J.-P. (1996), Lavoisier chemist, biologist, economist, Philadelphia, University of 
Pennsylvania Press 
QUESNAY F. & DUPONT DE NEMOURS P. S. (1768), Physiocratie, Leyde et Paris, Chez Merlin 
QUESNAY F. O. (1760), Tableau oeconomique avec ses explications, Paris 
SARICKS A. (1965), Pierre Samuel du Pont de Nemours, Lawrence, University of Kansas 
Press 
SCHELLE G. (1888), Du Pont de Nemours et l'école physiocratique, Paris, Librairie 
Guillaumin et Cie 
STEINER P. (1998a), La "science nouvelle" de l'économie politique, Paris, Presses 
universitaires de France 
STEINER P. (1998b), Sociologie de la connaissance économique : essai sur les rationalisations 
de la connaissance économique (1750-1850), Paris, Presses universitaires de France 
STEINER P. (2000), « L'économie politique du royaume agricole: François Quesnay », pp. 620, 
in BÉRAUD A. & FACCARELLO G., Nouvelle histoire de la pensée économique, vol. 1. Des 
scolastiques aux classiques, Paris, La Découverte 
 16 
THÉRÉ C. & CHARLES L. (2008), « The Writing Workshop of François Quesnay and the 
Making of Physiocracy », History of Political Economy, vol. 40, n°1, 1-42 
THOMPSON M. (1969), « Causes and Circumstances of the Du Pont Family's Emigration », 
French Historical Studies, vol. 6, n°1, 59-77 
TRONC J.-L. (1994), « Les années Lavoisier de E.-I. Du Pont de Nemours », L'Actualité 
chimique, vol. 2, 55-56 
WALL J. F. (1990), Alfred I. du Pont : the man and his family, New York, Oxford University 
Press 
WEULERSSE G. (1910), Le mouvement physiocratique en France (de 1756 à 1770), Paris, F. 
Alcan 
YATES J. (1989), Control through communication : the rise of system in American 
management, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press 
                                                
i The Wealth of Nations is itself dedicated to the leader of the physiocratic school, François Quesnay. 
 
iii The texts in question are part of the Du Pont collections of the Eleutherian Mills Historical Library (EMHL) 
kept at the Hagley Library in Wilmington, Delaware (USA). We consulted them in spring 2008 thanks to 
funding from the French Agence Nationale pour la Recherche program on the “Socio-technical supports of 
entrepreneurship” (dir. Grossetti M. & Zalio .P.-P.). The documents from the Du Pont archives are referred to in 
this article by the first letter of the collection they come from (L for the Longwood Manuscripts and W for the 
Winterthur Manuscripts), followed by the group number and the individual document number. 
iv Du Pont developed this specific aspect of his thought lightheartedly some years later in: Du Pont de Nemours, 
1795. 
v Du Pont’s recent nobility (dating back only to 1783) and his having worked for and defended two successive 
kings made him an obvious target for the Committee of Public Safety. 
vi Letter from Pierre Samuel Du Pont de Nemours to his son Victor of November 29th, 1797 (EMHL, W2-504). 
vii Letter from Pierre Samuel Du Pont de Nemours to his son Victor of December 28th, 1797 (EMHL, W2-514) – 
the words that are underlined are underlined by Du Pont himself, who writes them in English and spells them 
this way. Mauritius (L’Isle de France) is probably known by Du Pont through one of his correspondents’ text 
(Bernardin de Saint-Pierre, 1773). 
viii Pierre Samuel Du Pont de Nemours, Extrait d’un plan d’une opération rurale et commerciale à exécuter dans 
les Etats-Unis d’Amérique, not dated (EMHL, L1-469). 
ix A famous example of colony planning is the experience of the town of Asilum in Pennsylvania, built jointly in 
the mid 1780’s by American entrepreneurs and French noblemen fleeing the Republic, an experience Du Pont 
must have been aware of and may well have used as a reference in his own colonial venture. 
x This is a model of action that Du Pont also carried out in his private life: the perspective of being allowed to 
marry his first wife-to-be, who was raised in a higher class of society than his, was for instance what led him to 
make moves towards the court. It is also the model of action we have already met in Du Pont’s political 
economy, where the natural order intervened as a stimulating outcome for political action. The conditions that 
dictated his conduct were always future conditions, as seen from his days, rather than the conditions he lived and 
had been educated in. 
xi Pierre Samuel Du Pont de Nemours, Apperçu sur l’établissement commercial et rural que va former en 
Amérique la Maison Dupont de Nemours Père et Fils & Compagnie, not dated (EMHL, L1-471). 
xii Letter from Pierre Samuel Du Pont de Nemours to his son Victor of March 17th, 1798 (EMHL, W2-526). 
xiii Letter from Pierre Samuel Du Pont de Nemours to his son Victor of November 30th, 1798 (EMHL, W2-505). 
xiv E. g. in a “Table of values, prices, wages, spendings, etc. attributed in the Northern United States to the 
works, the products of agriculture or industry, etc. An extract from Larochefoucauld-Liancourt’s travels” 
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(EMHL, W2-5640). The travels of François Alexandre Frédéric de La Rochefoucauld, duke of Liancourt, during 
his exile in the United States, took place from 1795 to 1797. 
xv Pierre Samuel Du Pont de Nemours, État au vrai de notre affaire, not dated (EMHL, L1-483). 
xvi Pierre Samuel Du Pont de Nemours, Catalogue des mémoires, not dated (EMHL, W2-5472). 
xvii Letter from Pierre Samuel Du Pont de Nemours to Jacques Bidermann of December 1st, 1800 (cited in 
Du Pont, 1925:195). 
xviii  Book VI, verse 727. 
xix Pierre Samuel, although he wasn’t much of a measurer, has remained in history as one of the first systematic 
calculators, using economic calculation to decide upon the opportunity of the Louisiana purchase, for instance 
(he was actually the one who suggested the possibility of a purchase to Jefferson and then negotiated it with the 
French government), or the opportunity of home relief for the poor (Etner, 1987). 
